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Abstract—Touch screens have become ubiquitous in the past
few years, like for instance in smartphones and tablets. These
devices are often the entry door to numerous information systems,
hence having a secure and practical authentication mechanism
is crucial. In this paper, we examine the complexity of different
authentication methods specifically designed for such devices.
We study the widely spread technology to authenticate a user
using a Personal Identifier Number code (PIN code). Entering the
code is a critical moment where there are several possibilities for
an attacker to discover the secret. We consider the three attack
models: a Bruteforce Attack (BA) model , a Smudge Attack (SA)
model, and an Observation Attack (OA) model where the attacker
sees the user logging in on his device. The aim of the intruder
is to learn the secret code.
Our goal is to propose alternative methods to enter a PIN
code. We compare such different methods in terms of security.
Some methods require more intentional resources than other,
this is why we performed a psychological study on the different
methods to evaluate the users’ perception of the different methods
and their usage.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of technology, more and more per-
sonal and sensitive data is stored on our personal devices
such as smartphones. More and more companies provide
smartphones or tablets to their employees in order to facilitate
their work, for instance during business trips or inside the
enterprise to facilitate the access to data. In many companies
and organizations the digital revolution also starts by changing
the way information is collected using such new devices. With
the progress of technology and the improvements of batteries
capabilities, power of processors and new wireless connections
(WiFi, Bluetooth, etc.), smartphones or tablets are devices that
are part of this revolution. They allow the users to collect and
access to the data in a very practical way. However, these
devices have often no or limited authentication mechanisms.
Hence, to protect the access to sensitive data on such devices
from non-authorized persons, a secure authentication of the
user of the device is indispensable. Moreover, authentication
methods for tablets and smartphones are essential to protect
the data if the devices is lost or stolen, in particular to avoid
that some resources are used by non authorized persons, like
for example phone credits or even money in the case of a
credit card information.
One of the most common authentication methods is the
Personal Identifier Number (PIN) code usually consisting of
four or six digits. The PIN code is used for instance to unlock
a smartphone, to withdraw money from an Automated Teller
Machine (ATM), to activate/deactivate an alarm or to open
a door. For these reasons, the security of the PIN code is
essential. The PIN authentication method is known to be
fast and easy to use for most people, however it can be
dangerous to use it under certain circumstances depending
on the environment. For instance, an adversary can try to
get information on someone’s PIN code by direct observation
when the user withdraws money from an ATM, by using a
camera that records the PIN code, or even by using thermal
camera to know the touch used to enter the PIN code [20].
Nowadays, if an adversary knows our PIN code, one has to
contact the bank to change the credit card, which implies
expenses for credit card owner. On smartphones users should
change their PIN code in such a case, but in practice only
few users do that (probably because it requires remembering
the new code, because of the fear of not remembering the
new PIN code and not being able to use the smartphone). Our
goal is to see how we can improve the PIN code mechanism
in order to be more resistant to such attacks, in the sense of
resilience. For this, we consider several scenarios and compare
their security and their acceptability by the users in terms of
difficulty.
A. Contributions.
In this paper, we propose different authentication methods.
All the studied authentication methods are based on a secret
PIN, i.e. we consider neither pattern authentication methods
nor graphical or biometric authentication methods. In order to
authenticate, a user needs to knows a secret number with n
digits. We use 4 digits to test a concrete case with a reasonable
difficulty in terms of memory. Then we study the security of
the authentication methods given the following three threat
models:
1) The Bruteforce Attack (BA) model where the adversary
has only access to the device and has no other information
on the PIN code. For example the adversary stole a credit
card and tries to find the correct 4 digit code.
2) The Smudge Attack with Physical Access (SA) model
where the adversary is in possession of the user’s device
and has some information on the PIN code. For instance,
the adversary stole a smartphone and can see the finger
smudge on the locked screen.
3) The Observation Attack at Distance (OA) model where
the adversary can see the authentication process. This is
for example the case, when an adversary looks over the
shoulders of the victim while she is withdrawing money
at the ATM or unlocking her smart phone in public, e.g.
in crowded public transportation.
In addition of this technical consideration, we also study the
relation between users and PIN code from a psychological
point of view. That means, we study the perceived level
of difficulty for the users to use the different authentication
methods.
B. Related Work.
To protect the user against an adversary who can directly see
the entered PIN code, for example an adversary who is looking
over the shoulders of the victim while she is withdrawing
money at the ATM, i.e. the OA model (this attack is often
also called a Shoulder Surfing Attack), several authentication
methods are proposed in the literature. Lee proposed in [17] a
method using n rounds for a code composed of n digits. The
screen displays two horizontal arrays, one composed of digits
on the other composed of symbols. At the first round, the first
digit of the code is associated with a symbol, then the user will
use this symbol to select other digits of her code. Kwon and
Na [16] proposed a new pattern lock system called TinyLock.
The system uses a tiny pattern authentication method and a
validation phase to remove smudges from the screen of the
user and so to avoid attacks based on these traces. In this
paper, we consider only authentication methods based on PIN
codes. In [28], Shi et al. proposed an authentication method
that for each login, after the user inserts her bank card into
the ATM, the machine displays a table where each cell of
which contains a number. The assignment of numbers to cells
is executed in such a way that some copies of every number
are randomly assigned to the cells in the table. After the user
input the number corresponding to the first position of her
code, the same process is repeated until the user has input all
numbers of her code.
Some authentication methods are based on pattern lock
authentication systems. They consist in wiping a finger across
a specific sequence of nine dots chosen by the user to unlock
the device [13]. An analysis of such possible patterns space is
done in [27] while the different tradeoffs between usability and
security are studied in [19]. In a different way, Zezschwitz et
al. [30] proposed an authentication method for smartphones
called SwiPIN. This method uses only two simple touch
gestures like up or down. The authors prove that it is secure
against a human observer. Another approach was proposed by
Roth et al. [26]. The authors proposed two concepts which dis-
play digits in distinct sets on the screen. To determine the PIN
code, a user repeatedly indicates the respective target set. Then
the intersection of these sets is used as the code to authenticate
the user. Davis et al. shown in [8] that when the user choose
is graphical password drawing a pattern in the screen, the low
entropy produces a non-negligible drawback for some shemes.
However, Wiedenbeck et al. proposed the Convex Hull Click
scheme [31] allows a user to prove knowledge of the graphical
password safely in an insecure location because users never
have to click directly on their password images.
Other authentication methods based on graphical password
have been proposed and are presented by Biddle et al. in the
survey [6]. These methods consist in knowing a sequence
of unique images selected by the user to make a “story”.
In [14], Jermyn et al. proposed a authentication method using
graphical input devices that enable the user to decouple the
position of inputs from the temporal order in which those
inputs occur, they shown that this decoupling can be used
to generate password schemes with substantially larger and
memorable password spaces. With the system “Deja vu”,
presented in [10], the authors use images instead of PIN
code to authenticate users. In [12], Hayashi et al. use modified
versions of known images to authenticate users.
In [5], the authors propose a PIN entry system based on
audio or touch-sensitive cues. They link movements on a
mobile phone touch screen with the display of non-visual cues;
a selection of a sequence of these cues composes a password.
Another recent technique, called Illusion PIN (IPIN), is
based on some optical illusions [23]. It allows the user, who
has to be close to the device, to to see the right keypad to
enter her PIN, while an attacker who is looking at the device
from a bigger distance sees a fake keypad.
With the development of biometric sensors on smartphones,
biometric authentication methods are more and more popu-
lar [18]. Evangelin and Fred proposed a method using physical
characteristics recognition [11], while Sun et al. proposed an
authentication method based on a hand gesture signature [29].
Unlike these authentication methods, we are interested in
PIN codes where the user enters a sequence of digits, since
this mechanism is easier to put in place. We do not consider
authentication methods based on patterns.
In this article, we only aim at analyzing the difficulty for
an adversary to guess a PIN code according to his knowledge.
We do not aim at breaking the protocols used to verify if the
PIN code is correct, as done for instance in [21].
C. Outline.
First, we present in Section II six different authentication
methods based on the PIN code. Then we expose three
different threat models in Section III and study the security of
the presented authentication methods depending on these three
threat models in Section IV. Finally, we give a psychological
study for the links between the users and the usage of the
authentication methods.
II. AUTHENTICATION METHODS WITH PIN CODES
Different methods of authentication are possible. Some of
them require to memorize a numerical code, other a graphic
pattern. In the following, we give different authentication
methods based on PIN codes. We analyze their security in
Section IV in the different attack scenarios. By security, we
mean the difficulty for an adversary to guess the PIN code.
A. PIN Code with a Deterministic Placement (PDP)
The PIN code with a Deterministic Placement (PDP) is the
most commonly used authentication method, and is very pop-
ular with smartphones or credit cards. It consists in entering
the secret code (usually four digits) on a deterministic numeric
pad, in others words where the numbers are always displayed
in the same position on the pad. An example of such pad is
given in Figure 1. The users, who wants to enter the PIN 1234,
has to successively enter the digit 1 then 2 then 3 and 4.
Fig. 1: Example of PDP PIN code.
B. PIN Code with a non Deterministic Placement (PnDP)
The PIN code with a non Deterministic Placement (PnDP)
is, as its name suggests, the authentication method where
numbers of the pad are displayed in different positions each
time it is used. For example, during the first login, the number
1 is displayed at the top left corner of the screen, but during
the second login this same number can be displayed in the
right bottom position as in Figure 2. The pad is thus different
each time a PIN code is asked for.
Fig. 2: Example of PnDP PIN code.
C. PIN Code Substring (PS)
The PIN code Substring (PS) asks the user for p ≤ n
specific digits of his PIN code where n the number of digits
composing the original PIN code of the user. The p positions
of the digits are randomly drawn for each authentication. For
instance in Figure 3, if the user’s code is 6789, and the
authentication terminal asks for positions 1 and 3 of the PIN
code, then the code for this session will be 68.
Fig. 3: Example of PS PIN code.
D. PIN Code Modulo a Random Number (PR)
The PIN code modulo a Random number (PR) consists in
adding randomness to the user’s code at each authentication
of the user. To do that, this authentication process displays
to the user a random number of the same size of the PIN
code. Then, the corresponding code is the addition modulo 10
between the digit of the PIN code (only known by the user)
and those of the random number displayed on the screen. For
example in Figure 4, if the user’s PIN code is 1956 and the
displayed random number is 3948 then the user needs to enter
the code 4894 since 3 + 1 = 4 mod 10, 9 + 9 = 8 mod 10,
4 + 5 = 9 mod 10 and 8 + 6 = 4 mod 10.
E. PIN Code Modulo a Random Number and Even Numbers
(PRE)
The PIN code modulo a Random number and Even numbers
(PRE) looks like PR but considers only the even numbers
Fig. 4: Example of PR PIN code.
present in the result of the addition modulo 10 between the
PIN code of the user and the random number displayed on the
screen. For instance as in Figure 5, if the user’s PIN code is
1234 and that the random number displayed on the screen is
4274, then after the addition modulo 10, we obtain 5408 since
1 + 4 = 5 mod 10, 2 + 2 = 4 mod 10, 3 + 7 = 0 mod 10,
and 4+4 = 8 mod 10. Keeping only the even numbers of the
result 5408 in the same order, the resulting code is 408.
Fig. 5: Example of PRE PIN code.
F. PIN Code Modulo a Random Number and Number of Even
Numbers (PRnE)
The PIN code modulo a Random number and number
of Even numbers (PRnE) looks like (PRE) but instead of
constructing the code with the resulting even numbers, the
code is the count of even numbers in the addition modulo 10
of the user’s PIN code and of the random number displayed
on the screen. For example in Figure 6, if user’s PIN code is
1234 and that the random number displayed on the screen is
4274, then after the addition modulo 10, we obtain 5408 since
1 + 4 = 5 mod 10, 2 + 2 = 4 mod 10, 3 + 7 = 0 mod 10,
and 4 + 4 = 8 mod 10. The code of the user consists in the
count the number of even numbers in 5408; hence the code in
this example is 3 since 5408 is composed of digits 4, 0 and
8 which are even. Notice that if we consider a PIN code with
only 4 digits, the numbers above 4 are useless; 4 corresponds
to the case where all digits of the result are even.
Fig. 6: Example of PRnE PIN code.
III. THREAT MODELS
We present in this section three different threat models
where the goal of the adversary is to find the secret PIN code
of the user.
A. Bruteforce Attack
The Bruteforce Attack (BA) model assumes that an ad-
versary has a physical control of the device, but no other
information about the PIN. For instance, the adversary could
have confiscated or stolen a smartphone. We stress that in
the bruteforce attack, the adversary has no other information,
about the PIN code of the user. To find the correct PIN code
of the user, the adversary must potentially try all possible
combinations.
B. Smudge Attack with Physical Access
The Smudge Attack with physical access [3] (SA) model
assumes that the adversary, as in the BA, is in possession of
the device. But on the contrary to BA, we assume in this threat
model that the adversary has auxiliary information on the
device’s PIN code, like for instance, finger traces, or smudges,
on the touch screen surface, or the wear of buttons on the
door code. An example of such attack is given in Figure 7. If
the numerical pad is deterministic, then the intruder can learn
which digits are used in the PIN code of the victim, but there
is still the order and or the repetitions of some digits to guess.
C. Observation Attack
The Observation Attack (OA) model assumes that the ad-
versary can see the authentication process. For instance, the
adversary can look over the shoulders of the victim while
she is withdrawing money at the ATM, or looking over the
shoulder in the subway while the victim is entering her PIN
code on her smartphone, or install a camera that records the
authentication process. This attack is also known as “shoulder
surfing attack” and illustrated in Figure 8.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We study in this section the security of the six presented
authentication methods according to the following three threat
models: the Bruteforce Attack, the Smudge Attack with
Fig. 7: Example of a smudge attack.
Fig. 8: Example of a shoulder surfing attack from [23].
Physical Access, and the Observation Attack presented in
Section III. We define the security of an authentication method
as the number F , where F is the maximal number of codes
that an attacker – in the given setting – has to try in the
worst case (when only the last PIN he tried is the correct one)
to be sure to authenticate. For a classical PIN authentication
method, this corresponds to the key space, for example for a
PIN code composed of four digits, the number F is equal to
104 = 10 000. It can also differ from the key space if for
example only parts of the PIN are used to authenticate. F
depends on the number of digits of the PIN code (denoted by
n), on characteristic parameters of the method, and the type
of attack.
It is important to note that we assume that the attacker can
try to authenticate as often as he wishes, which is usually the
case if he is in possession of the device. We do not consider a
limitation of the number of guesses, for example the limit of
three tries as used for credit cards, which often is an efficient
counter measure.
A. Security of PIN Code with a Deterministic Placement
(PDP)
a) BA Analysis: The maximal number of codes to be
tested depends on the length of the code, i.e. the number of
digits composing the PIN code of the user. Assume the code
is a digital code of length n, then the number of arrangement
with repetitions is naturally F (n) = 10n.
b) SA Analysis: As shown in [20], if a user has with-
drawn money at the ATM then an attacker equipped with a
thermal camera can retrieve the t digits used for the user’s
code. The problem of the adversary is then to find the correct
order of the digits since the thermal camera gives to the
adversary only digits used by the user but does not inform on
their order. In other terms, the problem is to find the number
of surjective functions from 10 elements (the set of digits) to
a set of t elements1, which corresponds to S(n, t) the Stirling
number of second kind [1], [24], [15], where
S(n, t) =
t∑
k=0
(−1)t−k ·
(
k
t
)
· kn .
We then obtain that F (n, t) = S(n, t).
c) OA Analysis: In the OA model, the adversary can
watch the victim when she is authenticating. In the case of the
PIN code with deterministic placement, the adversary retrieves
directly the secret code of the victim. Hence, F (n) = 1.
B. Security of PIN Code with a non Deterministic Placement
(PnDP)
a) BA Analysis: As for PDP, the maximal number of
codes to be tested depends on the length of the code. Assuming
that the code is a digital code of length n, then the number of
possible codes is also F (n) = 10n. In the bruteforce model,
the randomness does not provide additional security since the
space of secret code stays the same.
b) SA Analysis: We still assume that the PIN code is a
digit code of length t. In this case, the adversary knows the
t buttons that the user has used for the authentication. The
number of the combinations of these t touch is given by the
Stirling number which is equal to
∑t
k=0(−1)t−k ·
(
t
k
) · kn.
However, the PnDP authentication consists to place digits
in a random order on the screen. Hence, the number of
arrangements with repetitions is equals to
F (n, t) =
(
10
t
)
·
t∑
k=0
(−1)t−k ·
(
k
t
)
· kn .
c) OA Analysis: As for PDP, if an adversary can watch
the authentication screen of the victim, the adversary retrieves
directly the secret code of the victim, i.e. F (n) = 1.
C. Security of PIN Code Substring (PS)
a) BA Analysis: In this situation, the authentication
method asks to the user 1 ≤ p ≤ n digits of its PIN code
where n is the length of the original secret PIN code of the
user. Hence, the number of possibilities for an adversary to
find the correct p digits is F (p) = 10p.
1https://oeis.org/A019538
b) SA Analysis: Assume that an adversary sees t ≤ p
smudges of fingers on the screen, where p is the number of
positions asked to the user. These residues give information
on the p wanted digits. On p positions, we are in the same
situation that the SA analysis of the PDP authentication
method. Hence, there are S(p, t) possible sequences, and as
the indications of p positions are not known, the adversary tests
p among n combinations of positions. Finally, the adversary
has to test all the arrangements with repetitions for n − p
digits on which he has no information. Hence, the number of
configurations is:
F (n, p, t) = 10n−p ·
(
n
p
)
· S(p, t) .
c) OA Analysis: In the case where the adversary has the
total vision, he learns directly the p elements of the PIN code
during an authentication of the user. Since the length of the
PIN code is n, it remains 10n−p combinations to be tested.
Remark: We can wonder how many times the adversary
needs to see a user authenticating on average before knowing
the entire PIN code of the user.
To simplify, we first study the case where p = 1, then we
propose an upper bound. Let Ti be the number of authenti-
cations to know i digits from i − 1 known digits. Then, the
required total number of authentications to obtain n known
digits is equal to:
T =
n∑
i=1
Ti
Assume that the adversary has already obtained i − 1
different digits and he is watching the user authentication until
he obtains a new digit. If the length of the PIN code is n, then
the probability for the adversary to know a new digit equals
to:
Pi =
n− i + 1
n
In this situation, Ti follows a geometrical law of parameter
Pi. Hence,
E[Ti] =
n
n− i + 1
Finally, the average total number of authentications for p = 1
is
E[T ] =
n∑
i=1
n
n− i + 1
By generalization and without taking into account the con-
straint to have two wanted digits at different positions, we
obtain for 1 ≤ p ≤ n:
E[T ] <
n
p
·
⌈
n∑
i=1
1
n− i + 1
⌉
.
D. Security of PIN Code Modulo a Random Number (PR)
a) BA Analysis: As for PDP and PnDP, the bruteforce
analysis to find the secret code with PR authentication gives a
number of arrangements with repetitions equal to F (n) = 10n.
b) SA Analysis: With the added random number to the
secret PIN code, the adversary cannot take information from
the t buttons used by the user. Hence, the adversary is in the
same case that the bruteforce analysis and the number of codes
is equal to F (n) = 10n.
c) OA Analysis: In this case, we assume that an adversary
sees the random number that the user adds to its PIN code, and
the code that the user inputs to the screen. Then, the adversary
can compute directly the secret PIN code of the user from these
two numbers by subtracting modulo 10 the code given by the
user to the random number displayed to the screen F (n) = 1.
E. Security of PIN Code Modulo a Random Number and Even
Numbers (PRE)
a) BA Analysis: Although there are
∑n
i=0 5
i possible en-
tries for a user, it is nevertheless necessary to test F (n) = 10n
PIN codes since the adversary must apply them the PRE
method to be sure to be able to authenticate.
b) SA Analysis: As well as for the BA analysis, we have
inevitably 10n tests to be made by the adversary. In fact, the
random number used in every authentication prevents from
having more information. Thus the authentication requires the
explicit search of the PIN code.
Remark: There is a probabilistic method allowing on
average to authenticate more quickly than using bruteforce. If
we systematically type the same sequence of even numbers,
we have a certain probability of succeeding because of the
random character of the method. Indeed, if we note k the
number of even digits in the result of the addition modulo 10,
there is a probability P (n, k) that the result of the addition
contains a sequence of k even digits defined at first:
P (n, k) =
(
n
k
)
2n · 5k
If we study the continuation of Bernoulli experiment of pa-
rameter P (n, k), by noting X the random variable representing
the average number of necessary tests to succeed by seizing
a sequence fixed of k even digits, the expected value of X
value is equal to:
E[X] =
2n · 5k(
n
k
)
c) OA Analysis: We estimate here the complexity of the
bruteforce knowing that the user entered p ∈ J1, n − 1K even
digits during the authentication. The fact is that we have no
control over the value p. We ignore what are the digits of the
random number which gave these p even numbers during their
modulo 10 addition with those of the PIN code, we must then
test all the combinations of p elements among n and complete
with all the arrangements with repetitions of odd digits for
n− p unknown digits. Thus, we have a complexity of
F (n, p) =
(
n
p
)
· 5n−p
We can also propose a probabilistic method that uses the
information obtained after each authentication of the user.
We can estimate the probability for a number a ∈ J0, 9K to
be at the position b ∈ J1, nK in the PIN code by testing
every combination of the input in the PIN code. With the
frequency of occurrence of numbers at each position, we can
compute how many authentications in average are needed and
the maximum frequencies giving the correct PIN code.
F. Security of PIN Code Modulo a Random Number and
Number of Even Numbers (PRnE)
a) BA Analysis: In the case of the PRnE authentication
method, classic bruteforce in 10n is not necessary. Indeed only
the knowledge of the parities of the digits of the PIN code
comes into the play, consequently we can restrict us to all the
arrangements with repetitions of 0 and 1. This means counting
binary and thus testing F (n) = 2n sequences.
b) SA Analysis: We have the same situation as for the
bruteforce attack, because no information can be learned with-
out the value of the random number. We thus have F (n) = 2n.
c) OA Analysis: Knowing that the user entered a number
p ∈ J1, nK during his authentication, which always represents
the number of present even digits in the result of the addition
modulo 10 of the random number with the PIN code. It means
that there are p digits of the random number which are the
same parity that those of the PIN code. From the parities of
the random number, we can determine the parities of the PIN
code by testing all the combinations (of p among n sequences
of 0 and 1), which gives a complexity of F (n, p) =
(
n
p
)
.
Remark: Again, there is a probabilistic method allowing on
average to authenticate more quickly than using bruteforce. If
we enter systematically the same sequence of number of even
numbers, we have a certain probability to succeed in logging
in thanks to the random character of the method. Indeed, if we
note k the number of even digits in the result of the addition
modulo 10, there is a probability Pk that the result of the
addition contains k even digits, i.e.
Pk =
(
n
p
)
2n
If we study the continuation of the experiments of Bernoulli
of parameter Pk by noting X the random variable representing
the average number of necessary tests to succeed in becoming
identified by seizing a number fixes k of even digits, the
expected value of X costs then
E[X] =
2n(
n
p
)
Hence, in order to minimize E[X], we observe that k must
be close to n/2.
G. Summary
In Figure 9, we recall all the results obtained for all our
authentication methods. We can see the following:
BA: All the methods have similar results with a maximal
security, except PRnE and PS. PRnE has the lowest
security and PS has a security that depends on the
number of digits that are required for the authenti-
cation.
SA: For a fixed value of n, we choose the average security
for the methods that depend on multiple variables.
Then we obtain the following order:
PR = PRE ≥ PnDP ≥ PS ≥ PDP ≥ PRnE
OA: For this attack, we can easily classify methods by
algebraic comparison:
PS ≥ PRE ≥ PRnE ≥ PR = PnDP = PDP
V. ACCEPTABILITY OF METHODS
From a psychological point of view, our authentication
methods can be divided into two categories regarding primer
and computation. Concerning the primer, we have authenti-
cation methods that require a primer – such as the presence
of a random number – and the ones that require no primer.
Similarly, there are methods that require computation and the
ones that do not. These distinctions are important because they
are known to have an influence on individual’s (participant’s)
cognitive load. The main structure in humans for processing
and storing information, namely working memory, has limited
capacity in terms of processing speed and the amount of
information that can be stored [4]. According to the model
devised by Cowan [7], only few elements can be processed
and held in memory at once. Therefore the two following
categories were introduced:
• Authentication methods requiring neither addition nor
primer: PDP, PnDP and PS.
• Authentication methods requiring addition and a primer:
PR, PRE and PRnE.
Two studies aimed to evaluate a priori the acceptability of
our different authentication methods, for instance during the
unlocking of a smartphone. The first was an exploratory and
a qualitative study including 8 participants. The second was a
quantitative study including 88 participants.
A. Exploratory Study
On the one hand, the first experiment aimed to assess the
influence of the random placement of digits on the screen. On
the other hand, it aimed to collect data concerning the usability
of authentication mechanisms.
In this exploratory study, participants were presented with
the five authentication methods as an authentication mech-
anism for unlocking a smartphone. After having tested the
different authentications methods, the participants evaluated
all methods based on several criteria such as a priori repre-
sentation, feeling of safety/security, usability, and were asked
to choose their preferred method.
More precisely, in this experiment eight participants evalu-
ated all five authentication methods. Four participants were fe-
male and four were male. These eight participants are between
24 and 45 years old. Four participants have evaluated these
methods with a traditional touch screen on which digits were
displayed in numerical order while the other 4 participants
evaluated the methods with a random touch screen on which
numbers were displayed in a random order.
Methods
Intruder
BA SA OA
PDP 10n S(n, t) 1
PnDP 10n
(
10
t
) · S(n, t) 1
PS 10p 10n−p · (np) · S(p, t) 10n−p
PR 10n 10n 1
PRE 10n 10n
(
n
p
)
5n−p
PRnE 2n 2n
(
n
p
)
Fig. 9: Summary of security analysis for each method, where we use the following notations: BA for Bruteforce Attack, SA
for Smudge Attack, OA for Observation Attack, PDP for PIN code with a Deterministic Placement, PnDP for PIN Code with a
non Deterministic Placement, PS for PIN code Substring, PRE for PIN Code Modulo a Random Number and Even Numbers,
PRnE for PIN Code Modulo a Random Number and Number of Even Numbers.
For each authentication method, the following points were
assessed:
• Attitudes, a priori representations
– Preliminary knowledge and use of PIN codes, feeling
of invulnerability, usability, awareness of the need to
protect personal data, etc.
∗ Do you lock your phone?
∗ Which authentication method do you use to unlock
it?
∗ How would you benefit from switching authentica-
tion methods?
• Perception of the authentication methods
– Order them:
∗ According to order of preference.
∗ According to safety level.
– Debriefing.
∗ Why these choices?
∗ What do you think of this particular authentication
method?
• Conclusion questions
– Frequency of use.
– Knowledge of new technologies.
B. Results of the Exploratory Study
a) Influence of the digit order of display: The use
of traditional touch screen or random touch screen had no
influence on the participants’ answers. This account seems
satisfactory as according to Nielsen’s work on usability [22],
75% of problems can be detected between 3 and 5 subjects.
Henceforth, in the quantitative study, only the traditional touch
screen was used for all authentication methods, and PnDP was
not considered.
b) Attitudes and a priori Representations: We analyzed
the results as follows:
• For some people, locking is not usual as the following
comment shows: “I do not want to use any authentication
method, I have too much to codes to remember and
moreover, my phone was never stolen”.
TABLE I: Preference orders.
Meth.
Ord. 1 2 3 4 5
PDP 4 2 0 0 2
PS 3 3 1 1 0
PR 1 1 3 0 3
PRE 0 1 1 5 1
PRnE 0 1 3 2 2
• Moreover, participants may have a feeling of control: “I
do not need an authentication method, I pay attention”.
• When the lock option is set up, securing data seems
unnecessary due to the frequent number of calls.
• Locking the phone is not always perceived as a secure
solution “I slide my finger on the screen, I do not see the
use of the PIN code”.
• Nevertheless, some users express more concerns: “I want
to block the access for my child and to my colleagues”
or “I want to lock my phone today because the con-
fidentiality and the sensitivity of transported data have
increased”.
• And users are at least aware of advanced methods of
authentication: “I use fingerprint and the PIN code, there
could be retinal check, smart cards, etc.” or “I lock my
phone with four digits but there is also the fingerprint
and voice recognition”.
• Finally, we would like to stress that the “mathematical”
authentication methods are not mentioned except for the
fact that PIN codes sometimes use 8 digits instead of 4.
c) Perception of Authentication Methods: Table I intro-
duces participants’ preferences of the authentication methods.
Table II introduces the rankings of feeling of security and
Table III introduces rankings of usability. For each table,
the values displayed in cells correspond to the number of
participants who chose a particular order and method. Hence,
each column displays a total of 8 (as for 8 participants). Each
participant had to rank the 5 methods on a scale from 1 to 5
(1 being the least preferred method and 5 most preferred one).
We remark:
• The security perception is inversely proportional to the
ease of handling for the presented method.
TABLE II: Security feeling order.
Meth.
Ord. 1 2 3 4 5
PDP 4 1 1 0 1
PS 0 4 1 1 1
PR 0 0 4 2 1
PRE 0 1 0 3 4
PRnE 3 1 1 1 1
TABLE III: Ease of handling order.
Meth.
Ord. 1 2 3 4 5
PDP 5 0 1 0 1
PS 0 4 1 1 1
PR 0 1 5 1 0
PRE 0 1 0 3 3
PRnE 2 1 0 2 2
• The preference of the different authentication methods
seems to be more linked to the ease of handling rather
than to the safety of the solutions as it has been shown
in the previous section.
These results also show that:
1) participants perceive different levels of security generated
by the different proposed authentication methods;
2) but the overall preferences for a given authentication
methods are less influenced by the perceived security of
data than by the ease with which a particular method is
handled.
We expose below participant’s comments for each method
according to this first experiment, where participants are
represented by their number to respect their anonymity.
PDP. The traditional method, not necessary secure but the
most simple in the cognitive sense.
#1: “It is the method that I usually use.”
#3: “Easy to use.”
#4: “Basic, easy to hack.”
#5: “Technically outdated.”
#6 and #7: “I do not particularly care, but com-
pared to other methods, it is the fastest /
the one that require the least efforts.”
PS. The ideal trade-off.
#2: “One my favorites in terms of security.”
#3: “Simple.”
#4: “Remains simple but is still more secure.”
#6: “There is not addition and the random fea-
ture is nice.”
#7: “New, simple and fast.”
PR and PRE.
Problems of learning, memorizing, and efficiency.
#1: “It is a difficult method to use, loss of time,
and too much thinking.”
#2: “It is expensive, and we can easily block
the phone in case of emergency due to the
number of trials.”
#3: “Great chance to find by chance by anyone.”
#4: “Anxiety, there are people who are going to
have trouble.”
#6: “Complicated to do all these calculations,
in addition with possibility to be wrong.”
#7: “Playable, but for the random code, it would
be necessary to put small numbers, not to
exceed the tens.”
PRnE. Feeling of security.
#3: “Great chance to find by chance by anyone.”
#5: “Too complicated while the chance to find
the solution is 66%.”
Based on the data from these 8 participants, the PS and PRE
solutions appear as the best ones in terms of security. However,
although these two solutions are considered secure, they are
not deemed user friendly and are perceived as too complex to
implement.
C. Quantitative Study
Eighty-eight participants responded to a questionnaire con-
taining different theoretical items (intentions of use, attitudes,
perceived control, etc.) for authentication methods PS (n =
31), PR (n = 27), and PRE (n = 30). These authentication
methods were chosen based on the results of the qualitative
study above, and following the theoretical concepts borrowed
from the theory of planned behavior (TPB) [2] and the
technology acceptance model (TAM) [9].
According to TPB, the intention of adopting or not adopt-
ing a given behavior is the result of three determinants: 1)
behavioral beliefs, which may be defined as a general feeling
(favorable or unfavorable) towards behavior; 2) normative
beliefs, which correspond to an individuals perception of
the normative expectation of others and the motivation to
comply with it; and 3) control beliefs, which refer to an
individuals perception of any constraints (internal or external)
on performing behavior.
With TAM, intention is determined by: 1) perceived ease
of use, in other words “the degree to which the user expects
the target system to be free of efforts” in using the technol-
ogy [9, p. 985]; and 2) the users perception of usefulness,
in other words his or her “subjective probability that using
a specific application system will increase his or her job
performance” [9, p. 985].
Among the most salient results, we can observe that:
• Participants consider themselves to be the most in control,
i.e. they perceive the most ease of use, when using the
authentication method PS (x¯ = 3.6 out of 5) compared to
the authentication methods PR and PRE (x¯ = 2.9 out of
5 and 2.5 out of 5, respectively), where F = 7.94, p =
0.001. We recall that F is the F -statistic and p is the
probability of obtaining the same (or even more extreme)
value of the test if the null hypothesis were true.
• Participants consider that even other users will be more
likely to use the authentication method PS, i.e., feel more
comfortable using it even for “social” reasons (x¯ = 3.45
out of 5, and 2.82 out of 5 and 2.48 out of 5 for
authentication methods PR and PRE, respectively), where
F = 6.81, p < 0.01.
• And finally, in line with the qualitative study (see above),
the perceived risks for authentication method PS (M
= 3.13 out of 5 points maximum) are higher than the
perceived risks for solutions PR and PRE (x¯ = 2.63 and
2.50 out of 5, respectively), where F = 3.80, p < 0.05.
In line with the qualitative study, it is observed that solution
PS seems to be the most accessible to the participants, with
a perceived level of security lower than for solutions PR and
PRE. The quantitative study did not reveal more intentions for
the use of solution PS (x¯ = 2.68 out of 5 maximum) compare
with solutions PR and PRE (x¯ = 2.33 and 2.11, respectively).
At first glance, data concerning intentions of use seem to
confirm the hypothesis of a better acceptability of the PS
solution as compared to the other solutions
This would also be consistent with the diffusion theory of
innovation [25], according to which the norm of ”continuity”
determines the acceptability of novelty; and the latter is
certainly more important for the solution PS (close to the 4-
digit codes, solution PDP) than for the solutions PR and PRE
(or even PRnE).
D. Summary
Using Figure 9 and Table I, we graphically represent the dif-
ferent authentication methods with respect to two parameters:
the participant’s preference and the security.
Figure 12 shows the user’s preference and the security
for each proposed authentication method. The horizontal axis
represents the participant’s preference and the vertical axis
represents the security of the method in the Bruteforce Attack
(OA) model. The more a method is on the right side of the
graphical representation, the more the method is prefered by
participants. In the same way, the more a method is on the top
of the graphical representation, the more the method is secure
in the OA model.
Figure 11 shows the user’s preference and the security for
each proposed authentication method in the Smudge Attack
with Physical Access (SA) model.
Figure 12 shows the user’s preference and the security
for each proposed authentication method in the Observation
Attack at Distance (OA)model. Hence, in the OA model, the
best authentication method is PS. In fact, it is the best solution
in the participant’s preference point of view and also the best
solution in the security point of view.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have shown that different authentication methods are
available for modern devices that are more and more used in
the company of the future. We analyzed the security of these
methods against different types of attacks:
• Bruteforce Attacks,
• Smudge Attacks,
• Observation Attacks.
Some of these methods are very simple to use and are widely
accepted by the public as for example the traditional PIN
User’s pref.
Security
PRE PR
PRnE
PDP
PS
Fig. 10: User’s preference vs Security in the Bruteforce Attack
(BA) model.
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Fig. 11: User’s preference vs Security in the Smudge Attack
with Physical Access (SA) model.
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Fig. 12: User’s preference vs Security in the Observation
Attack at Distance (OA) model.
code with four digits. However, the security of such methods
is questionable. Indeed, it is fairly easy for someone to see
the PIN code being entered and to later steal and use the
credit card. Therefore, innovative authentication methods such
as randomized PIN codes and modulo PIN codes offer a better
level of security. Indeed, even if someone sees the PIN code
being entered they will not be able to reproduce the code and
use the stolen credit card for their own benefit. The acceptable
trade off seems to be PS method, which consists to ask only
a subset of the digit of the PIN code. This method is already
used in practice, for example by some banks to authenticate
their users online. However, the present study has shown that
such an authentication method is still generally perceived as
difficult to implement. That is why, future research needs to
be done to explore the possibility of a secure authentication
method that is much more user friendly, and to compare the
acceptability of biometrics authentications to the PIN codes.
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